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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and
e¢ ciency of loyalty rewards in markets for ￿nal consumption goods.
While the literature has emphasized the role of loyalty rewards as
endogenous switching costs (which distort the e¢ cient allocation of
consumers), in this paper l analyze the ability of alternative designs
to foster consumer participation and increase total surplus. First,
the e¢ ciency of loyalty rewards depend on their speci￿c design. A
commitment to the price of repeat purchases can involve substantial
e¢ ciency gains by reducing price-cost margins. However, discount
policies imply higher future regular prices and are likely to reduce
total surplus. Second, ￿rms may prefer to set up ine¢ cient rewards
(discounts), especially in those circumstances where a commitment to
the price of repeat purchases triggers Coasian dynamics.
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11 Introduction
All major airlines currently run frequent ￿ yer programs (FFPs) that o⁄er
travellers free tickets and class upgrades according to the number of miles
or trips ￿ own with them. Hotels, supermarkets and other retailers have also
launched similar programs. Some other ￿rms o⁄er much simpler schemes to
reward consumer loyalty. Exemplary cases include the classic repeat pur-
chase coupon o⁄ered by some manufacturers or the popular buy-ten-and-
get-one-free type of program, very common among service suppliers, such
as golf courts or car washing networks. In all these cases sellers precommit
themselves to treat repeat buyers better than newcomers. This is why these
pricing schemes are usually labeled "loyalty programs" or "loyalty rewards"
(LRs). Some observers have interpreted these schemes as merely quantity
discounts (non linear prices). However, this interpretation clouds over the
time dimension that is essential in all these examples. Firstly, in some cases
the seller commits to the future transaction price, in others (like repeat pur-
chase coupons) the net transaction price is left undetermined. Hence, it is
not immediately obvious whether by handing out coupons ￿rms are inducing
a lower transaction price for repeat purchases, or a higher price for new cus-
tomers. Secondly, consumer preferences may change during the time interval
between purchases. Thirdly, setting up LRs may a⁄ect rivals￿future pricing
behavior.
The theoretical literature has emphasized the role of LRs as endogenous
switching costs.1 Most papers have analyzed the role of LRs in some version
of the Hotelling framework where consumers￿relative preferences are subject
to shocks. In this set up LRs allow ￿rms to retain previous customers, even
when rival ￿rms o⁄er varieties that better match their current preferences.
As a result, LRs are welfare reducing because they cause a mismatch in
the allocation of consumers. However, in this view it is unclear whether LRs
tend to relax or exacerbate price competition (See, for instance, Banerjee and
Summers, 1987; Caminal and Matutes, 1990; Cairns and Gailbraith (1990),
Bulkley (1992), Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000, Kim et al., 2001, Caminal and
Claici, 2007, Ackerman (2007) , Chen and Pearcy (2007), and Fong and Liu,
1A completely di⁄erent view of FFPs has recently been put forward by Basso et al.
(2009). These programs are alternatively understood as instruments to exploit the agency
relationship between employers (who pay for the tickets) and employees (who book travel
and enjoy the bene￿ts of LRs). In other words, FFPs are the "bribes" o⁄ered to employees
to book ￿ ights at higher prices.
22009).2 It has been shown that the e⁄ect of LRs on average prices largely de-
pends on market structure and the particular design of the reward programs.
However, the literature has paid very little attention to the endogenous de-
sign of LRs, as most papers simply assume that ￿rms are restricted to use a
particular speci￿cation.3
Unfortunately, the available empirical evidence is scarce. In the marketing
literature one can ￿nd weak evidence of the positive e⁄ect of introducing LRs
on a ￿rm￿ s market share (See, for instance, Sharp and Sharp, 1997, and Lal
and Bell, 2003), although its e⁄ect on pro￿tability is less clear. More recently,
Hartman and Viard (2008) have empirically challenged the view of LRs as
endogenous switching costs. Lederman (2007, and 2008) points to the airline
industry and provides convincing evidence on the positive e⁄ects of frequent
￿ yer programs on demand and prices, although one can only speculate about
the welfare implications of these ￿ndings.
The goal of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of LRs beyond
the endogenous switching costs motive. In particular, I study the ability
of alternative designs to foster consumer participation and increase total
surplus. The closest precedent I am aware of was published long time ago:
CrØmer (1984)4. This paper studied a monopolist￿ s incentives to set up LRs in
a market for an experience good. An important challenge ever since has been
to provide an explanation for the variety of designs that we observe in the real
world and determine their welfare implications. In order to accomplish this I
examine a stylized two-period monopoly model, which is the simplest set up
to demonstrate how ￿rms￿optimal design of LRs is a⁄ected by the possibility
of triggering Coasian dynamics. I also discuss how the main insights extend
to a multi-period and multi-￿rm frameworks.
As in the previous literature, an essential feature of the model is that
consumers face some uncertainty about future preferences. In a setting with
a homogeneous good, consumers can only be uncertain about their future
2Armstrong (2006) and Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) discus how this literature
￿ts into the broader theme of behavior-based price discrimination.
3Two exceptions are the duopoly models of Kim et al. (2001) and Caminal and Matutes
(1990). In the ￿rst paper ￿rms are allowed to choose between cash rewards and product
rewards. The latter are more e¢ cient in the sense that they imply a lower cost for ￿rms for
the same consumer bene￿t. In either case it is assumed that ￿rms cannot commit to the
future transaction price, only to the magnitude of the discount enjoyed by repeat buyers.
Caminal and Matutes (1990) show that when ￿rms can choose between committing to the
price of repeat purchases and a discount (a coupon) they choose the ￿rst option.
4See also Bulkley (1992).
3valuation of the good, in which case alternative designs of LRs will a⁄ect
consumer participation di⁄erently. However, it will also be argued that, in a
competitive setting with di⁄erentiated products, it will be important whether
consumers are uncertain about their common valuation of the good or about
the relative valuation of di⁄erent varieties. Overall, the model predicts that
both the design of the reward program and its welfare implications depend
on the amount of uncertainty faced by consumers.
In this sense the subject of this paper is closely related to Chen and Pearcy
(2007). While they examine the role of preference uncertainty on dynamic
pricing, they have a di⁄erent goal and set up. In particular, they assume
consumers are uncertain about their future relative valuation, and hence
LRs become endogenous switching costs. Also, under some circumstances
￿rms may initially ￿nd it optimal not to make any commitment and then
subsequently treat newcomers better than repeat buyers: play a poaching
strategy. In our set up it is always optimal to commit to reward loyalty, and
hence the focus is exclusively on the design and e¢ ciency of LRs.
As a benchmark case I consider the optimal monopoly pricing under un-
limited commitment capacity. Such an optimal policy clari￿es what ￿rms
attempt to achieve by setting up reward programs. With respect to the case
of no commitment, the optimal policy under full commitment exhibits the
following features. First, ￿rms ￿nd it optimal to commit to prices equal to
marginal cost for repeat purchases, in order to maximize the value of the
￿rm-customer relationship. The seller is able to appropriate the e¢ ciency
gains created in the second period through a higher ￿rst period price. Sec-
ond, ￿rms ￿nd it optimal to commit to a future price for newcomers, one
above the static monopoly price. The reason is that the loss in second period
pro￿ts caused by distorting the price upwards is more than compensated by
the positive e⁄ect on ￿rst period demand and pro￿ts. Third, the gap between
the price for newcomers and for repeat buyers raises consumers￿willingness
to pay in the ￿rst period (demand function shifts upwards) and, moreover,
it raises price elasticity. Hence, ￿rms ￿nd it optimal to serve a larger num-
ber of consumers in the ￿rst period. Clearly, the ￿rst and the third e⁄ect
lead to e¢ ciency gains, although the second e⁄ect has a negative impact on
e¢ ciency.
The full commitment case is of course highly unrealistic. Firms may
be able to sign implicit or explicit contracts with their current customers,
but it is nearly impossible to do it with consumers they have not met yet.
Thus, a somewhat more realistic scenario would be one where the monopolist
4enjoys unlimited commitment power with respect current customers, but no
commitment power at all with respect future customers.5 In this context the
monopolist must still make a design choice. It can either commit to the price
of repeat purchases, or to a discount policy. In the latter case the level of
transaction prices to be paid by loyal consumers is left undetermined. For
simplicity I restrict attention to lump-sum discounts.
To illustrate how important is the level of uncertainty about future pref-
erences in shaping the optimal monopoly policy, it is su¢ cient to restrict
attention to the two extreme scenarios.
In the ￿rst scenario (Section 3) preferences of individual consumers are
independent over time. This implies that the demand functions of repeat
and ￿rst time buyers exhibit the same price elasticity. If the seller commits
to a lower price for repeat buyers then in the second period, it will charge
the static monopoly price to newcomers. Expectations of such a high price
for newcomers makes it in fact pro￿table for the seller to commit to a price
equal to marginal costs for repeat buyers. From a welfare perspective such
a pricing policy is unambiguously bene￿cial: lower price for repeat buyers,
same price for ￿rst time buyers in the second period, and higher consumer
participation in the ￿rst.
Alternatively, the seller may use a discount policy. In this case, it can
achieve a rigid combination of a high price for newcomers (higher than the
static monopoly price) and a low price for repeat buyers (lower than the
static monopoly price). In the particular case where the distribution of con-
sumer valuations is uniform, it turns out that such a discount policy reduces
welfare, although for the monopolist this policy is just as pro￿table as the
commitment to the price of repeat purchases.
In the second scenario (Section 4) the correlation between preferences
of an individual consumer over time is almost perfect.6 In this case, most
of the potential ￿rst time buyers in the second period have a relatively low
willingness to pay. As a result, if the ￿rm decides to commit to a low price
for repeat purchases, then in the second period it will also choose a relatively
low price for newcomers. In other words, commitment to the price of repeat
purchases triggers Coasian dynamics. In the ￿rst period the anticipation of
5Unlimited commitment power regarding current consumers can also be an optimistic
description of the real world. In any case, I will not deal here with the issue of how
reputation and/or consumer protection laws can help enforcing ￿rms￿promises.
6Under pefect correlation, individual consumers face no uncertainty and ￿rms have no
incentive to set up LRs.
5a low price for newcomers more than compensates for the pro￿table e⁄ects of
a low price for repeat buyers. In other words, commitment to a low price of
repeat purchases will have little e⁄ect on ￿rst period pro￿ts, while drastically
reducing second period pro￿ts.
In this context, the monopolist may well be motivated to consider using
discounts. If the seller o⁄ers a lump-sum discount to be applied to repeat
purchases, then, along the equilibrium path, the marginal ￿rst period con-
sumer has a valuation, r1, approximately equal to the static monopoly price.
In the second period the ￿rm cannot ￿nd it optimal to set a regular price
that implies a net transaction price for repeat buyers below r1. If it did, an
increase in the regular price would have almost no e⁄ect on repeat purchases
(almost all repeat buyers have reservation values above r1). At the same
time, an increase of the regular price above r1 will have almost no e⁄ect
on the purchases of newcomers (very few newcomers have reservation values
above r1). Therefore, the optimal monopoly policy consists of a lump-sum
discount that implies a higher price for newcomers (the second e⁄ect) with a
negligible e⁄ect on the price for repeat buyers. Finally, the price gap induced
by the discount encourages higher sales in the ￿rst period (the third e⁄ect).
The welfare implications of LRs in this case are negative, at least in the case
of the uniform distribution.
In Section 5 I will discuss how these results are modi￿ed in a competitive
environment. It is argued that competition reduces ￿rms￿incentives to use
e¢ cient designs of LRs, at least if the only source of uncertainty is about
common valuations while relative preferences remain constant. A multi-
period framework clearly enlarges the set of possible designs of LRs, but
some simple designs like the popular buy-ten-and-get-one-free might also
be explained by the attempt of avoiding the negative pro￿t implications of
Coasian dynamics.
Some concluding remarks (Section 6) close the paper.
2 The model
A pro￿t maximizing monopolist produces a non-durable good at constant
marginal cost, which for simplicity is normalized to zero. The market dura-
tion is for two periods, labeled 1 and 2. There is a continuum of consumers
with mass one; in each period every consumer purchases either one unit or
zero. Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of the good. More
6speci￿cally, in the ￿rst period each consumer￿ s valuation is a realization of
the random variable, r, distributed over the interval [0;1] with probability
density f (r) and cumulative density function F (r), which is assumed to
be twice continuously di⁄erentiable. I also assume that the density function
does not decrease too quickly, ￿2f (r)￿f0 (r)r < 0: This assumption implies
that the one period pro￿t function is strictly concave.
Consumer preferences are imperfectly correlated across periods. In par-
ticular, consumer i￿ s second period valuation, ri2; is equal to her ￿rst period
valuation, ri1, with probability ￿; and an independent random draw from the
common density function, f (r), with probability 1 ￿ ￿: The parameter ￿ is
common knowledge and lies in the interval [0;1].
If consumer i purchases one unit of the good at price p; she obtains an
instantaneous net utility of ri￿p. If she does not consume her instantaneous
utility is zero.
If the ￿rm is unable to discriminate between repeat buyers and newcomers
then it will set the static monopoly price, pm; in both periods: That is, pm
is the solution to the problem of choosing p in order to maximize ￿ (p) ￿
[1 ￿ F (p)]p: The ￿rst order condition characterizes the solution:
￿
0 (p
m) = 1 ￿ F (p
m) ￿ f (p
m)p
m = 0
Also, the static total surplus obtained from transacting at price p is
TS (p) ￿
R 1
p rf (r)dr; and consumer surplus is CS (p) ￿
R 1
p (r ￿ p)f (r)dr:
For some occasions, and in order to pin down some of the net e⁄ects, I
will restrict myself to the case of a uniform distribution: f (r) = 1:
Both the ￿rm and consumers are forward looking, and in period 1 they
maximize the expected discounted value of their payo⁄s using the same factor
￿;￿ 2 [0;1]:
Most of the insights of the model can be obtained by analyzing two ex-
treme values of ￿: ￿ = 0 (zero correlation in individual preferences) and
￿ = 1 ￿ ￿; where ￿ is a positive but arbitrarily small number (almost per-
fect correlation). It is well-known (See Armstrong, 2006, Section 2) that if
consumer preferences are perfectly stable then LRs are irrelevant. This ap-
proach will enable us to examine the optimal pricing policy as we approach
the scenario with perfectly stable preferences (as ￿ goes to zero).
A crucial feature of the model is the ￿rm￿ s ability in the second period
to price discriminate between repeat buyers and newcomers. On top of that,
in the ￿rst period the ￿rm has access to alternative commitment devices.
7It has been shown (see, for instance, Chen and Pearcy, 2007) that, in some
circumstances, ￿rms may choose not to reward consumer loyalty and rather
simply o⁄er better deals to non-customers (poaching strategy). In this model,
poaching is never part of the monopolist￿ s optimal plan, and hence we can
focus on the optimal design of LRs.
As a benchmark I will consider the case where the ￿rm can commit in
the ￿rst period to all future prices. A more realistic scenario will be one
where the ￿rm has unlimited commitment capacity regarding their current
customers, but cannot commit to the price charged in the second period to
new customers. Moreover, I will focus attention on two designs of LRs: the
￿rm may choose either the price of repeat purchases or a lump-sum discount
with respect to the regular price. The ￿rm can also choose not to commit
in the ￿rst period, and yet remain free to price discriminate in the second
period.
3 Monopoly pricing under independent pref-
erences
In this section I restrict attention to the case of zero correlation between
current and future preferences (￿ = 0:) Let p1 be the price charged in the ￿rst
period, and pr
2 and pn
2 the prices charged in the second period to repeat buyers
and newcomers, respectively. In the ￿rst period, consumer i￿ s expected utility
of purchasing the good is ri1￿p1+￿CS (pr
2); and the expected utility of not
purchasing is ￿CS (pn
2). Thus, all consumers with ri1 ￿ r1 will choose to
purchase, where r1 is given by:
r1 = p1 + ￿ [CS (p
n
2) ￿ CS (p
r
2)] (1)
Hence, the demand fromrepeat buyers and newcomers is qr
2 = [1 ￿ F (r1)][1 ￿ F (pr
2)]
and qn
2 = F (r1)[1 ￿ F (pn
2)], respectively. The discounted value of pro￿ts at





2) = [1 ￿ F (r1)]p1 + ￿ f[1 ￿ F (r1)]￿ (p
r
2) + F (r1)￿ (p
n
2)g (2)
83.1 The benchmark case
Suppose that in the ￿rst period the ￿rm has full commitment capacity. That
is, it can set all prices: p1;pr
2;pn
2: Thus, the monopolist chooses (p1;pr
2;pn
2) in
order to maximize (2) subject to (1). The main characteristics of the optimal
pricing policy are summarized in the following proposition.7
Proposition 1 Under ￿ = 0 and full commitment capacity the monopoly
solution involves: (a) pr
2 = 0;(b) pn
2 > pm; and (c) r1 < pm: More speci￿cally,
pn
2 and r1 are given respectively by:
1 ￿ F (p
n




2 = 0 (3)
and
1 ￿ F (r1) ￿ f (r1)r1 ￿ f (r1)￿ [TS (0) ￿ TS (p
n
2)] = 0 (4)
First, the monopolist ￿nds it optimal to commit to a price for repeat
buyers equal to marginal cost, which is the price that maximizes the value
of the ￿rm-customer relationship. The ￿rm is willing to e¢ ciently price the
repeat purchase because it can appropriate these gains by charging a higher
price in the ￿rst period. Second, the monopolist sets the future price for
newcomers above the monopoly price. Starting at pn
2 = pm; a small increase
in pn
2 implies a second order loss in second period pro￿ts, but it involves a
￿rst order gain in ￿rst period pro￿ts. The reason is that for consumers a
higher pn
2 makes the ￿rst period purchase relatively more attractive. Third,
the discrimination between repeat buyers and newcomers raises consumers￿
willingness to pay in the ￿rst period (the demand function shifts upwards),
which leads the monopolist to serve a larger number of consumers in the ￿rst
period. Clearly the ￿rst and the third e⁄ects are welfare enhancing, but the
second is welfare reducing.
In fact, we can compute the increase in total welfare associated to the
optimal commitment policy with respect to the case of no discrimination
(when the ￿rm charges pm in both periods):
7If we allow the monopolist not to commit to (pr
2;pn
2) in the ￿rst period, then the
monopolist ￿nds it optimal to set in the second period pr
2 = pn
2 = pm: The same outcome
can be achieved by committing to pr
2 = pn
2 = pm in the ￿rst period. Thus, expanding the
strategy set to include no commitment in the ￿rst period is redundant. In other words,
the ability to price discriminate between repeat buyers and newcomers is irrelevant in the
absence of commitment.
9￿W = ￿ [1 ￿ F (r1)]
Z pm
0









The three terms of the right hand side correspond to the three e⁄ects
discussed above.
If we restrict attention to the uniform distribution case, then the ￿rst two
















Since the third e⁄ect is always positive, the overall welfare e⁄ect is also
positive. Summarizing:
Remark 2 If f (r) = 1 then total surplus under the full commitment policy
is higher than under no discrimination.
3.2 Commitment to the price of repeat purchases
In the real world most ￿rms seem able to commit to their future pricing
policy with respect to their current customers, or at least are able to lay
down signi￿cant restrictions on their future pricing behavior. In the extreme
case, sellers can sign legally enforceable, long-term contracts with current
buyers. However, it is much less plausible that ￿rms do this with consumers
they still have not interacted with. A similar argument applies to implicit
contracts that rely on reputation.8 In this and the next subsections I take
the view that the monopolist can commit to a particular scheme to reward
consumer loyalty, but it must leave undetermined the price to be paid by
newcomers. In particular, in this subsection the monopolist chooses (p1;pr
2)
in the ￿rst period and pn
2 in the second.9 The optimal pricing policy is
8In the real world LR are not always fully speci￿ed and ￿rms maintain some discre-
tionary power. For instance, airlines unilaterally change from time to time the conditions
to earn and redeem frequent ￿ yer miles. In this paper I entirely ignore any limitation to
￿rms￿commitment power with respect to their current customers.
9Once again, we could allow the monopolist not to commit to pr
2 in the ￿rst period.
In this case, the monopolist ￿nds it optimal to set in the second period pr
2 = pn
2 = pm:
The same outcome can be achieved by committing to pr
2 = pm in the ￿rst period, which
is shown to be a dominated strategy.
10summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Under ￿ = 0; and if the ￿rm can only commit to the price
for repeat buyers, the monopoly solution includes: (a) pr
2 = 0;(b) pn
2 = pm;
and (c) r1 < pm: Consequently, the ￿rm￿ s ability to commit to the price of
repeat purchases raises total welfare. More speci￿cally, r1 is given by:
1 ￿ F (r1) ￿ f (r1)r1 ￿ f (r1)￿ [TS (0) ￿ TS (p
m)] = 0
The intuition behind these results is rather straightforward. In the second
period, the monopolist ￿nds it optimal to set the static monopoly price to
newcomers, since pn
2 is chosen in order to maximize F (r1)[1 ￿ F (pn
2)]pn
2.
However, the incentives to adopt a marginal cost pricing rule for repeat
purchases remain constant. Since pn
2 = pm > pr
2 = 0, the demand function in
the ￿rst period shifts upwards with respect to the static case and, as a result,
the optimal p1 involves higher sales in the ￿rst period than in the absence of
commitment. In other words, in this case we obtain the ￿rst and third e⁄ects
identi￿ed in the previous subsection, both with positive welfare implications,
but the second e⁄ect is null. More speci￿cally, the increase in total welfare
associated to the optimal commitment policy (with respect to the case of no
discrimination) can be written as:






rf (r)dr > 0
3.3 Discounts
Suppose now that in the ￿rst period the seller o⁄ers its customers a ￿xed
discount (coupon) of face value c. This implies that in the second period the
net transaction price for repeat buyers is pr
2 = pn
2 ￿c; where pn
2 is selected in
the second period. In particular, the ￿rm chooses pn
2 in order to maximize
(even in the case c = 0):
￿2 = [1 ￿ F (r1)]￿ (p
n
2 ￿ c) + F (r1)￿ (p
n
2)
In case an interior solution exists, it is given by:
[1 ￿ F (r1)]￿
0 (p
n
2 ￿ c) + F (r1)￿
0 (p
n
2) = 0 (6)
11Thus, in this case pn
2 > pm > pn
2 ￿ c: The ￿rm might have incentives to
choose a corner solution where newcomers are not served: pn
2 ￿ 1: In such a
corner solution the ￿rm ￿nds it optimal to set the static monopoly price to
repeat buyers: pn
2 ￿ c = pm: Thus, the equilibrium value of pn
2 will be given
by equation (6); provided the following constraint is satis￿ed:
[1 ￿ F (r1)]￿ (p
n
2 ￿ c) + F (r1)￿ (p
n
2) ￿ [1 ￿ F (r1)]￿ (p
m)
Thus, by using discounts the monopolist can achieve a certain commit-
ment to a lower price for repeat buyers and a higher price for newcomers (￿rst
and second e⁄ects), provided the solution is interior. If the monopolist ￿nds
it optimal to exclude newcomers in the second period, then a discount policy
involves the second e⁄ect, but not the ￿rst. Finally, because of the di⁄erent
expected consumer surplus obtained by repeat buyers and newcomers, the
monopolist sets a ￿rst period price so it serves more ￿rst period consumers
than in the no commitment case (the third e⁄ect). More speci￿cally, in the
￿rst period, if the monopolist anticipates an interior solution in the second
period, then it chooses p1 and c in order to maximize:
￿1 = [1 ￿ F (r1)]p1 + ￿ fF (r1)￿ (p
n
2) + [1 ￿ F (r1)]￿ (p
n
2 ￿ c)g
subject to r1 = p1 + ￿ [CS (pn
2) ￿ CS (pn
2 ￿ c)] and subject to pn
2 being
determined by equation (6): The solution involves r1 < pm: Alternatively, if
in the second period newcomers are excluded, then the ￿rst period objective
function becomes:
￿1 = [1 ￿ F (r1)][r1 + ￿TS (p
m)]
Also in this case, the monopoly solution would involve r1 < pm:
The following proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 4 If ￿ = 0 the monopolist￿ s optimal discount policy implies:
(i) pr
2 ￿ pm; (ii) pn
2 > pm; and (iii) r1 < pm:
Once again, it is impossible to compare in general the size of the second
(negative) e⁄ect to the size of the ￿rst and third e⁄ects (positive). If we re-
strict attention to the uniform density case then we can o⁄er an unambiguous
answer (For the proof see Appendix 1):
12Remark 5 If f (r) = 1 the optimal discount policy reduces total surplus.
The main reason a discount policy reduces total surplus is the concavity
of total surplus as a function of price. In the absence of commitment in the
second period a monopolist sets a price equal to 1
2: In contrast, under the op-
timal discount policy the price charged to newcomers is raised above 1
2 more
than the reduction obtained by repeat buyers. As a result, total surplus gen-
erated in the second period is lower than in the absence of commitment (the
sum of the ￿rst and second e⁄ects has a negative sign). Finally, the positive
welfare e⁄ect generated in the ￿rst period, associated to higher consumer
participation, is not capable of reversing this result.10
3.4 Comparing alternative pricing schemes
After characterizing the optimal price commitment and discount policies in
the last two subsections, we can now compare the preferred policy from a so-
cial (total surplus) and private (monopoly pro￿ts) viewpoints. In particular,
we can consider the following three scenarios: (a) commitment to the repeat
purchase price, pr
2; (b) commitment to a lump-sum coupon, c; and (c) no
commitment (which, in this case, is equivalent to no price discrimination).
Once again, functional forms are crucial to pin down the results. From
Proposition 3 and Remark 4 it follows that:
Remark 6 If f (r) = 1 the social planner prefers the price commitment
policy, (next) the no commitment scenario, and (￿nally) the discount policy.
Let us now turn to private incentives, It is important to remember that
no commitment can be implemented by setting pr
2 = pm, or c = 0: Since the
monopolist does not ￿nd neither of these two options optimal, then the no
commitment scenario is clearly dominated by either of the two alternative
scenarios. The following result is proved in Appendix 2:
Remark 7 If f (r) = 1 the monopolist is indi⁄erent between committing
to the price of repeat purchases and a discount policy, and both are strictly
preferred to the no commitment scenario.
10As discussed in the Appendix, the impact of the optimal discount policy on welfare
is negative but of second order. This suggests that may there exist alternative functional
forms under which a discount policy may increase welfare.
13Thus, in the uniform distribution (linear demand) case the monopolist
is indi⁄erent between these two alternative designs of LRs. However, from
an e¢ ciency point of view discount policies should not be allowed and price
schemes that involve a commitment to the price of repeat purchases should
be promoted.
The uniform distribution case is actually a borderline case (See Appendix
3):
Remark 8 There exist density functions for which the monopolist either
strictly prefers committing to the price of repeat purchases over a discount
policy and viceversa.
In sum, the main conclusion of this subsection is that, under independent
preferences, a monopolist may have incentives to choose a design of LRs that
increases welfare, for some density functions, but it may also choose a design
with much less favorable welfare implications, for other functions.
4 Monopoly pricing under almost perfectly
correlated preferences
This section deals with the case where preferences of an individual consumer
are almost perfectly correlated: ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿, where ￿ is an arbitrarily small,
positive number.
The demand in the second period from repeat buyers, qr





[1 ￿ ￿F (r1)][1 ￿ F (pr
2)] if 1 ￿ pr
2 ￿ r1
[1 ￿ F (r1)][1 ￿ ￿F (pr
2)], if 0 ￿ pr
2 ￿ r1






￿F (r1)[1 ￿ F (pn
2)] if 1 ￿ pn
2 ￿ r1
F (r1) ￿ [1 ￿ ￿ + ￿F (r1)]F (pn
2); if 0 ￿ pn
2 ￿ r1
Thus, at a price equal to r1 these demand functions are not di⁄eren-
tiable. The price elasticity of the demand from repeat buyers is higher for
price increases than for price decreases, but the reverse in the demand from
newcomers.
14In order to simplify the presentation, I assume that the market is semi-
anonymous (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1998). That is, price discrimination re-
quires the voluntary participation of consumers. For instance, the seller may
be able to distinguish repeat buyers from newcomers if they hand in a coupon
they obtained with their ￿rst period purchase, or if they voluntarily regis-
tered in the reward program. Therefore, we can restrict attention to price
schemes that truly reward loyalty (pr
2 ￿ pn
2). Also, if the ￿rm does not make
any commitment in the ￿rst period then it would set the static monopoly
price in each period. I argue below that the same qualitative results are
obtained in case of an identi￿ed customers market (in which case the seller
can price discriminate in the second period against former customers).
4.1 The benchmark case
Let us reconsider the full commitment case in which the monopoly can choose
all prices in the ￿rst period. The characterization of the indi⁄erent consumer
in the ￿rst period depends on how her willingness to pay in the ￿rst period,
r1; compares to second period prices. In particular, there are three possible
cases: (i) r1 ￿ pr
2 ￿ pn
2, (ii) pr
2 < r1 ￿ pn
2 and (iii) pr
2 ￿ pn
2 < r1: In Appendix
4 I prove the following lemma:
Lemma 9 If ￿ is arbitrarily close to 1 and under full commitment capacity,
the monopoly solution satis￿es: pr
2 < r1 ￿ pn
2.
Thus, in case (ii) we have:11
r1 =
1
1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
fp1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p
r
2 + ￿￿[CS (p
n
2) ￿ CS (p
r
2)]g









2 + ￿F (r1)￿ (p
n
2)g
The next proposition characterizes the optimal monopoly strategy under
full commitment.
11In an identi￿ed customers market other cases are also feasible. However, it can be
shown that the seller does not ￿nd it optimal to commit to a policy with pn
2 < pr
2. Hence,
the lemma would still hold.
15Proposition 10 If ￿ is arbitrarily close to 1 and under full commitment
capacity, the monopoly solution involves: (a) pr
2 = 0; (b) pn
2 > pm; and (c)
r1 < pm:
The equations that characterize pn
2 and r1 are respectively:
1 ￿ F (p
n





1 ￿ F (r1) ￿ f (r1)r1 ￿ f (r1)
￿￿
1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
[TS (0) ￿ TS (p
n
2)] = 0
If we take the limit as ￿ goes to zero, then r1 goes to pm and pn
2 goes to
ps, where ps is implicitly given by:
1 ￿ F (p
s) ￿ F (p
m)f (p
s)p
s = 0 (7)
Given that F (pm) < 1, equation (7) implies that ps > pm: Thus, the
monopolist￿ s optimal policy for ￿ = 1￿￿ is qualitatively identical to the one
for ￿ = 0.
If we take the limit as ￿ goes to zero, then the monopoly solution becomes
p1 = (1 + ￿)pm;r1 = pm;pr
2 = 0;pn
2 = ps. In fact, if ￿ = 0 the monopolist
is indi⁄erent between the previous solution and the repetition of the static
monopoly price: p1 = r1 = pr
2 = pn
2 = pm: However, only the former is robust
to a small amount of uncertainty (￿ > 0):
4.2 Commitment to the price of repeat purchases
The seller chooses (p1;pr
2) in the ￿rst period and pn
2 in the second.
When individual preferences are highly correlated the ￿rm￿ s commitment
to the price of repeat purchases generates Coasian dynamics. Almost all
potential new customers in the second period have a willingness to pay lower
than r1. As a result the ￿rm has strong incentives to set a relatively low
pn
2, in particular lower than r1: More speci￿cally, pn
2 is the solution of the
following optimization problem: choose p in order to maximize:
￿
n
2 (p) = fF (r1) ￿ [1 ￿ ￿ + ￿F (r1)]F (p)gp
subject to r1 ￿ p ￿ pr
2: The ￿rst order condition of an interior solution
is:
16F (r1) ￿ [1 ￿ ￿ + ￿F (r1)][F (p
n




2] = 0 (8)
Since ￿ is an arbitrarily small number then 0 < pn
2 < r1. Suppose that in
the ￿rst period the ￿rm chooses to commit to the price for repeat purchases.
That is, p1 and pr















r1 = p1 + ￿￿[CS (p
n
2) ￿ CS (p
r





The solution includes pr
2 = 0 and r1 is implicitly given by:
1 ￿ F (r1) ￿ f (r1)fr1 + ￿￿[TS (0) ￿ TS (p
n
2)] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p
n
2g = 0 (9)
Note that 0 < r1 < pm and, as ￿ goes to zero, r1 converges to a value
strictly below pm. In the limit as ￿ goes to zero the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts become:
￿1 = ￿ (r1) + ￿￿ (p
n
2) << (1 + ￿)￿ (p
m)
where r1 and pn
2 are given by equations (8) and (9) evaluated at ￿ = 0:
Therefore, in this case if the ￿rm commits to the price of repeat purchases,
then it obtains a level of pro￿ts lower than if it chooses not to commit.
All this discussion is encapsulated in the following proposition:12
Proposition 11 If ￿ is arbitrarily close to 1 and the ￿rm￿ s commitment
capacity is restricted to the price of repeat purchases, then the monopolist
prefers not to use such a commitment capacity and set the static monopoly
price in both periods.
12In an identi￿ed customers market, the monopolist may prefer to commit to the price
for repeat purchase over no commitment. However, as discussed below, both options are
dominated by a discount policy.
174.3 Discounts
The seller sets (p1;c) in the ￿rst period and pn




Given the discount c, in the second period the ￿rm chooses pn
2 in order to
maximize second period pro￿ts. In principle there are three possible cases:
(i) r1 ￿ pr
2 ￿ pn
2, (ii) pr
2 < r1 ￿ pn
2 and (iii) pr
2 ￿ pn
2 < r1: The next Lemma
(See Appendix 5) allows us to concentrate on case (i):
Lemma 12 The optimal discount policy involves r1 ￿ pr
2 = pn
2 ￿ c:
The intuition here is the following. Most repeat buyers have a reservation
price higher than r1: Thus, if the ￿rm lowers pn
2 below c + r1 it will attract
very few repeat buyers; hence it cannot be an optimal strategy.
Thus, it follows that in the second period pn
2 is the solution to maximize:
￿2 = [1 ￿ ￿F (r1)]￿ (p
n




2 ￿ c ￿ r1:
The ￿rst order condition of an interior solution is:
[1 ￿ ￿F (r1)]￿
0 (p
n
2 ￿ c) + ￿F (r1)￿
0 (p
n
2) = 0 (10)
Thus, pn
2 ￿ c is below but arbitrarily close to pm and pn
2 > pm.
Suppose that in the second period the constraint r1 ￿ pn
2 ￿ c is not
binding. Then, the ￿rm￿ s optimization problem in the ￿rst period consists
of choosing (p1;c) in order to maximize:
￿1 = [1 ￿ F (r1)]p1 + ￿ f[1 ￿ ￿F (r1)]￿ (p
n




r1 = p1 + ￿￿[CS (p
n




2 is given by equation (10). The ￿rst order conditions with respect
to p1 and c can be written, respectively:
1 ￿ F (r1) ￿ f (r1)fr1 + ￿￿[TS (p
n
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If we take the limit as ￿ goes to zero, then pn




goes to 1, and hence pn
2 goes to ps; de￿ned in equation (7), ps > pm:
Suppose now that in the second period the constraint is binding: pn
2 =
r1+c: Then the optimization problem can be reformulated as choosing (p1;c)
in order to maximize:
￿1 = [1 ￿ F (r1)]p1 + ￿ f[1 ￿ ￿F (r1)]￿ (r1) + ￿F (r1)￿ (r1 + c)g
where
r1 = p1 + ￿￿[CS (r1 + c) ￿ CS (r1)]
In this case the solution shares the same qualitative properties. All this
discussion is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 13 If ￿ is arbitrarily close to 1 the monopolist￿ s optimal dis-
count policy involves: (a) pr
2 is below but arbitrarily close to pm; (b) pn
2 is
arbitrarily close to ps and hence higher than pm; and (c) r1 < pm:
It is important to note that c converges to a strictly positive number
(ps ￿ pm) as ￿ goes to zero. This implies that for any ￿ > 0 the optimal
discount policy involves higher pro￿ts than in the case of no commitment
(c = 0): Thus,
Remark 14 If ￿ is arbitrarily close to 1, the monopolist prefers a discount
policy over a commitment to the price of repeat purchases.
In an identi￿ed customers market, if the monopolist does not make any
commitment in the ￿rst period then it will have incentives to price discrimi-
nate in the second period in favor of newcomers. This reduces ex-ante pro￿ts
far below the level obtained under no discrimination. Consequently, the mo-
nopolist still prefers to set c > 0 in the ￿rst period.
In terms of the three e⁄ects discussed above, the ￿rst e⁄ect (lower price
for repeat purchases) is negligible in the optimal discount policy. More specif-













In the case of a uniform distribution pm = 1
2;ps = 2
3. Thus, disregarding











Since r1 ￿ 1
2 ￿ ￿￿ 7
144, then ￿W ￿ ￿ 7
288￿￿ < 0:
Remark 15 If f (r) = 1; then the optimal discount policy reduces total sur-
plus.
Summarizing, if individual preferences exhibit very high serial correla-
tion then the monopolist prefers not to commit to the repeat purchase price
because this triggers Coasian dynamics. However, the monopolist ￿nds it
optimal to commit to a relatively large lump-sum coupon, which does not
signi￿cantly reduce the repeat purchase price but does raise the price charged
to newcomers. Under a uniform distribution, the monopolist￿ s favorite design
of LRs actually reduces total welfare.
5 Discussion
In this paper the analysis has been conducted in a stylized, two-period
monopoly model. How do ￿rms￿incentives to introduce LRs change in a
competitive environment? What kind of alternative designs might arise in
equilibrium in a multi-period framework?
5.1 Inter-￿rm competition
As discussed in the introduction, the literature has focused on the role of LRs
in a competitive set up (typically, a duopoly), where consumers are uncertain
about their relative valuations (their absolute valuations are assumed to be
of su¢ cient magnitude so that in equilibrium all consumers participate in the
market). LRs create endogenous switching costs and allow ￿rms to retain
20some of their customers, even when their current preferences better match
with the characteristics of the speci￿c product o⁄ered by rival ￿rms. For
example, some travellers may remain loyal to a particular airline because of
their status in its frequent ￿ yer program, despite of the fact that another
airline o⁄ers better schedules and connections for their current trip.
Most of the insights of the current model are likely to extend to a multi-
￿rm environment, provided consumers are uncertain only about their ab-
solute valuation, and hence their participation in the market. In particular,
￿rms￿incentives to set up LRs will closely resemble those analyzed in this
paper. However, inter-￿rm competition will bring about additional e⁄ects.
Consider a monopolistic competitive market: each ￿rm will not anticipate
any reaction to its choice of LRs program. However, in this case whether or
not other ￿rms are o⁄ering LRs will certainly a⁄ect individual incentives to do
so. Suppose a particular ￿rm faces a set of rivals that do not reward loyalty.
If the ￿rm commits to the price of repeat purchases, this will trigger Coasian
dynamics for two complementary reasons: (1) in order to lure consumers
with a high relative preference for the ￿rm￿ s product but a relatively low
willingness to pay (like in the model of this paper), but also (2) in order to
attract customers of rival ￿rms (low relative preference but high willingness
to pay). In contrast, if rival ￿rms actually commit to a low price for their
repeat buyers it becomes more di¢ cult in the second period to steal business
from rival ￿rms, and hence incentives to commit to a low price for repeat
purchases are enhanced. LRs programs are thus very likely to be strategic
complements and a model like this may exhibit a multiplicity of equilibria.
In an oligopolistic market each ￿rm will try to anticipate the rivals￿re-
action to its LRs program. Such an strategic e⁄ect may also in￿ uence equi-
librium decisions in complex ways which are exceedingly more di¢ cult to
visualize.
5.2 A multi-period framework
In the two-period framework it was shown that a monopolist may not ￿nd it
optimal to commit to a low price for repeat buyers due to the fact that such
a commitment will imply a low regular price in the future. The two-period
framework in a way exacerbates the strength of Coasian dynamics. Consider
a multi-period framework. A monopolist could set up a loyalty program
that o⁄ers consumers the right to purchase the good at a low price after n
purchases at the regular price (buy-ten-and-get-one-free kind of program.)
21In this case most repeat buyers pay the regular price in a given period, since
only a fraction 1
n+1 (in average) are exempted. As a result, incentives to set
a low regular price are signi￿cantly reduced (Coasian dynamics are avoided).
Consequently, ￿rms may ￿nd such a design pro￿table, at least compared with
the no commitment case.
Some of the insights of a multi-period framework might be made in the
two-period set up by allowing for random rewards. In this paper sellers are
restricted to deterministic schemes. Suppose we let the monopolist com-
mit to marginal cost pricing for repeat purchases only for a fraction ￿ of
￿rst period customers. By choosing ￿ properly Coasian dynamics can be
avoided, and such a policy could become pro￿table even if ￿ is close to 1.
Unfortunately, a full characterization of the optimal value of ￿ presents some
technical di¢ culties and is left for future research.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper I show that the design of LRs signi￿cantly matters for e¢ ciency.
In particular, a commitment to the price of repeat purchases may bring about
large e¢ ciency gains by fostering consumer participation, and hence elimi-
nating some of the ine¢ ciencies associated to market power. However, this
type of LRs may not be incentive compatible, in the sense that ￿rms may
prefer to use discount policies, which in many cases reduce total welfare with
respect to the case of the absence of any LRs. Thus, the paper contributes
to our understanding of the mechanisms (other than the creation of switch-
ing costs) by which LRs a⁄ect e¢ ciency. It also helps us to explain the
heterogeneity of designs observed in the real world (emphasizing the role of
the degree of uncertainty faced by individual consumers about their future
preferences).
The highly stilized model used in this paper is meant to capture qualita-
tive e⁄ects, with no intention of making any quantitative claims. However, if
taken literally some of the predictions of the model seem exaggerated when
compared to real world observations. In particular, LRs have a large e⁄ect
on the variance of transaction prices that a consumer experiences over time.
For instance, the commitment to the price for repeat purchases looks very
much like a two-part tari⁄. In the ￿rst period consumers pay a high price,
and in the second a price equal to marginal cost. In some cases, the optimal
discount policy also involves a discount equivalent to the static monopoly
22price-cost margin.
The "quantitative" predictions appear more moderate when we extend
the model in several directions. In particular, let us discuss several scenar-
ios. First (see the previous section), in a multi-period framework it may be
optimal to set up an scheme that rewards loyalty only after the consumer has
made a ￿xed number of purchases. Second, if we let product quality in the
second period be endogenous, then LRs may exacerbate the moral hazard
problem. More speci￿cally, if the ￿rm commits to a price equal to marginal
cost for repeat buyers but cannot commit to future quality standards, then
the incentives to maintain those standards in the second period will likely
deteriorate. As a result, the ￿rm may prefer to reduce the magnitude of LRs
in order to alleviate the quality underinvestment problem. Third, it would
be interesting to investigate the coexistence of consumers with di⁄erent time
horizons. For instance, consider a multi-period framework where in each pe-
riod a new cohort of consumers with a two-period horizon enters the market.
Suppose the ￿rm is unable to distinguish between consumers with di⁄erent
"ages". Then, blind to di⁄erential generations ￿rms will no longer be willing
to commit to marginal cost pricing for repeat buyers. This will be because
they will not be able to capture the entire surplus through the ￿rst period
price, which in this case will be closer to the static monopoly price.13
I have argued that all these considerations tend to reduce the magnitude
of LRs, at least if we restrict ourselves to a particular design (commitment to
the price of repeat purchases.) Future research should address how all these
considerations a⁄ect the optimal design.
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1 + (1 ￿ r1)2c
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2r1 (1 ￿ r1)
￿
(11)
In the second period, if c is su¢ ciently high, the seller may consider
deviating from the interior solution, disregarding newcomers (qn
2 = 0) and
choosing pn
2 such that pn
2 ￿ c = pm = 1
2: Such a deviation involves second




(1 ￿ r1) (12)
Thus, the seller will choose the interior solution if and only if (11) is
higher than (12); which can be written as:
4c
2 (1 ￿ r1) ￿ 1 (13)
Suppose that constraint (13) is not binding. Then the ￿rst period opti-
mization problem consists of choosing (p1;c) in order to maximize the present
value of pro￿ts:





2r1 (1 ￿ r1)
￿
subject to:
25r1 = p1 ￿
￿c
2
[1 ￿ c(1 ￿ 2r1)]
From the ￿rst order conditions we obtain that c = 1
2 and r1 = 8￿￿
16 : Note
that constraint (13) is satis￿ed. If the monopolists follows such a policy then
it makes ￿ = 64+80￿+￿2
256 : Alternatively, if the monopolist sets an arbitrarily
high c, which implies that in the second period qn
2 = 0 and pn
2 ￿c = 1
2, then it
also sets p1 = 1
2 ￿ ￿
16 (r1 = 1
2 ￿ 3￿
16); which implies that ￿ = 8+3￿
32 < 64+80￿+￿2
256 :
Hence, c = 1
2 and r1 = 8￿￿
16 is the monopolist￿ s optimal discount policy.
From equation (5) in the main text:
















Evaluating this expression at r1 = 8￿￿









If the ￿rm can commit to the price for repeat purchases, and F (x) = x, then
it chooses pr
2 = 0 (in the ￿rst period) and pn
2 = 1
2: Therefore, second period
pro￿ts are ￿2 =
r1
4 : The ￿rm chooses in the ￿rst period a price p1 in order to
maximize:




subject to r1 = p1 ￿ 3￿
8 : Thus, at the optimal policy r1 = 8￿￿
16 and ￿ =
64+80￿+￿2
256 , which coincide with those results obtained in the optimal discount
policy.
8.3 Remark 8
For simplicity, let us consider the case ￿ = 1:
EXAMPLE 1
Suppose that r = 1
2; with probability 1
2; and r is a random draw from a
uniform distribution on [0;1], with the complementary probability: Then the
static monopoly price is pm = 1
2; and monopoly pro￿ts per period are 3
8:
26For the moment suppose that in the ￿rst period, the monopolist sets p1
and LRs such that all consumers with r1 ￿ 1
2 purchase in the ￿rst period.
Hence, total sales are 3
4:
If the monopolist commits to pr
2 = 0, then pn
2 = 1
2; and second period







In the ￿rst period, a consumer with ri = 1
2 is willing to pay a price













If the monopolists sets a discount c ￿ 1;then in the second period it will
set pn
2 = 1
2 + c: First of all, it cannot be optimal to set pn
2 < 1
2: Second,
if the ￿rm sets pn
2 > 1
2 such that pn
2 ￿ c < 1
2 then second period pro￿ts
are ￿2 = 1
4
1











2 ￿ c): In this case, the
optimal price is pn
2 = 7+6c
8 ; which implies that pn
2 ￿ c > 1
2: We have reached
a contradiction. Third, if the ￿rm sets pn
2 such that pn
2 ￿c ￿ 1
2, then it ￿nds
it optimal to set pn
2 = 1
2 + c; which implies that second period pro￿ts are
￿2 = 5￿2c2
16 :
In the ￿rst period, a consumer with ri = 1

















16 : Thus, the optimal discount is c = 3
10; which implies that
the maximum amount of pro￿ts that can be obtained using a discount policy
is lower than what might be obtained under a price commitment policy.14
EXAMPLE 2





; and f (r) = 0, otherwise. In this
case, pm = 1
2 and pro￿ts per period are also 1
2 (present value of pro￿ts is equal
to 1): It is noteworthy that under such a policy total welfare is maximized.
Clearly, monopolists cannot bene￿t from a price commitment policy, since
there are not further gains from trade. However, a discount policy can in-
crease pro￿ts with respect to the no commitment case. In particular, consider
p1 = 1;c = 1
2: In the ￿rst period consumers will anticipate that pn
2 = 1; and
hence all consumers with ri ￿ 1
2 will be willing to buy the good in the ￿rst
period. As a result the present value of pro￿ts is ￿ = 5
4 > 1:




Let us ￿rst consider case (i)r1 ￿ pr
2 ￿ pn
2. In this case, the ￿rm￿ s present









2 + ￿F (r1)￿ (p
n
2)g
r1 = p1 + ￿￿[CS (p
n
2) ￿ CS (p
r
2)]
From the ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rm￿ s optimization problem, we can
characterize as follows the candidate to the monopoly solution:
1 ￿ F (p
n





1 ￿ F (p
r
2) ￿







1 ￿ F (r1) ￿ r1f (r1) ￿ f (r1)￿￿[TS (p
r
2) ￿ TS (p
n
2)] = 0
Note that as ￿ goes to zero, both pr
2 and r1 go to pm. Consider the
following deviation: pr
2 = 0 and p1 such that r1 and pn
2 remain unchanged.
The ￿rm can charge a higher p1 and the di⁄erence is equal to ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)r1 +
￿￿[CS (0) ￿ CS (pr
2)], where r1 and pr
2 are the candidate of the monopoly
solution. Thus, the change in pro￿ts associated with the deviation can be
written as a function of ￿:
￿￿
d (￿) = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[￿ (r1) ￿ ￿ (p
r
2)] + ￿￿[1 ￿ F (r1)][TS (0) ￿ TS (p
r
2)]
Note that ￿￿d (0) = 0; since at ￿ = 0 pr
2 = r1 = pm: Also,
d￿￿d (￿)
d￿
= ￿ (￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3 + ￿4)
where
￿1 = ￿[￿ (r1) ￿ ￿ (p
r
2)]
￿2 = [1 ￿ F (r1)][TS (0) ￿ TS (p
r
2)]
28￿3 = f￿￿f (r1)[TS (0) ￿ TS (p
r




￿4 = f￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿
0 (p
r








Note that evaluated at ￿ = 0; ￿1 = ￿3 = ￿4 = 0 and ￿2 > 0: Hence,
d￿￿d(￿=0)
d￿ > 0: Therefore, provided ￿ is a strictly positive, arbitrarily small
number, such a deviation is pro￿table and hence we can rule out case (i).
Ruling out a solution of type (iii) is much simpler. Suppose we have a
solution such that pr
2 ￿ pn
2 < r1: In this case:




2) + ￿CS (p
n
r) ￿ CS (p
r
2)]
The ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts in period 1 are:









The ￿rst order condition with respect to pn
2 evaluated at pn







m) = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ F (r1)][1 ￿ F (p
m)] > 0
This inequality together with the second order condition implies that
pn
2 > pm: However, the ￿rst order condition with respect to r1 implies that
r1 < pm: We have reached a contradiction.
8.5 Lemma 12
Let us ￿rst consider case (ii) pn
2 ￿c < r1. Then in the second period the ￿rm
chooses pn
2 in order to maximize:




2 ￿ c) + ￿F (r1)￿ (p
n
2)




Next, suppose the solution satis￿es (iii) pn
2 < r1. Then in the second
period the ￿rm chooses pn
2 in order to maximize:

















m) = ￿[1 ￿ F (r1)][1 ￿ F (p
n




2 ￿ c)] > 0
Hence, pn
2 > pm > r1: We have reached a contradiction.
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